From consensual principles and institutional work to social movement that transcends political affiliations.

Since the first publication of the Code of Conduct for Syrian Coexistence and the establishment of its council at the beginning of 2018, the media work of the council’s members and spokespersons was limited to giving simple explanations of the principles of the code of conduct and the duties of the council. Every member worked hard to respond to questions and to criticisms directed at the Code and the Council’s work, especially those that described the Code and the Council’s work as sectarian (based on their readings of press headlines).

Since the Code has become well- known in all circles, it is time to explain the whole idea behind its emergence, the institutional work built upon it, and the long-term objectives of this work. Therefore, this article will not cover the principles of the Code in detail, nor will it attempt to respond to what was said about it. In short, the aim of this article is to give definition and information. It’s up for the reader to analyze, build an opinion and judge for him or herself. Noting that detailed explanations of the Code and responses to what is written about it are under preparation, and part of them have already been prepared.

First: The starting point for the Code of Conduct

It should be noted that the work on this document began about four years ago. It started because the situation in Syria has become excruciating and unbearable, affecting all Syrians, whether inside or outside the country. Indeed, most Syrians have been affected by the war even though they did not participate in the military operations. Those Syrians who participated in the war are losers ­– regardless of its outcome – because they cannot be isolated from their country and society, which suffered and still suffers from this war. Undeniably, everyone is a loser in the Syrian war, and this will not change even if the balance of military forces on the ground changes.

The conviction that all Syrians are losers in this war and the rising sectarian, religious, regional, and ethnic hate speech in Syria prompted the council’s members to place the Syrians diversity subject on the discussion table and address this topic frankly and transparently. To avoid the transformation of hatred into a ​​collective revenge, the members agreed that every person is responsible for his or her own actions and emphasized the necessity to move away from collective accountability. It is important to note here that the transparency and clarity of the discussions led to the conviction that Syrians should sit down together, talk openly about their history to find the truth, and put it into a rational debate, no matter how painful that truth.

Here it must be said that three points are the core of the code of conduct: Firstly,  that Syrians are the only losers in the war; secondly, the necessity of disclosure among the different components of the Syrian society; and thirdly, the accountability of the individual, not the group. The three points were extensively discussed in several meetings before adopting them as principles in the Code of Conduct. As a matter of fact, the Code of Conduct came to exist after long dialogues, discussions and meetings and was not set as a goal at the beginning. Moreover, it can be said that the very idea of ​​dialogue was based in one way or another on these three points: And from the beginning, and contrary to all dialogue initiatives until that time, it adopted the idea that Syrians inside and outside the country should sit at the discussion table. Indeed, a dialogue without effective and active participation of Syrians from inside Syria, in their diversity and the diversity of their positions, is useless.

In short, this is the reason that prompted the management department to extend invitations to various Syrian personalities inside and outside Syria. Problems always arise in such work, including the concept of representation, criteria for selection of participants, and the limited number of invitations (due to financial and logistical capacities and security issues). However, what helped to resolve these matters was the conviction that there is no solution to the Syrian crisis except through dialogue between the various Syrian societal forces, as they represent different dimensions in the Syrian power structures, and in the opposition structure as well.

Second: The birth of the Code of Conduct and the establishment of its council

The idea to draft a document that deals with the emerging Syrian societal problems came after several meetings and rounds of discussions. The principles of the document are based on inclusive neutrality and represent a call to the conflict parties on the one hand, and to every Syrian on the other. Linking the principles of the Code a collective behavior on the one hand and putting these principles into practice on the other hand is the real guarantee for the Syrian society to restore its cohesion and its ability to coexist despite differences of opinion and attitude. That is, the ability of society to coexist with the optimal management of its differences. Therefore, the naming of the Code of Conduct for Syrian Coexistence came as the best expression of these ideas, bearing in mind that this title also has its relativity and problematic.

After the Code of Conduct was signed by the participants and it was published in the media, it was noticed that there was a vivid desire among participants to continue the work. Indeed, their conviction in the principles of the Code and the effort they invested in the meetings over more than two years showed their capability for institutional work.

From here came the idea of ​​establishing the Council of the Syrian Charter. Indeed, the council is an open body that welcomes the participation of every Syrian who is convinced in these principles and mainly seeks to introduce these principles, explain them and work on their basis. The council has founding members and others who joined later and adopted the principles of the Code. It should also be noted here that the limited logistical and financial capabilities are causing the slowdown of the process of expanding the circle of council members.

The Council also tries to tackle some problems in Syria by issuing statements that address specific emerging issues. Here it is worth saying that the statement’s language or vocabulary may not correspond to the desires of all parties, but in the end, it represents the mediated position between the members of the council. Certainly, the strength of the Code, the Council, and its Members lie primarily in their ability to absorb different opinions and positions and pour them into discussions and decisions.

Third: The future of Code and the Council

The signing of the Syrian Code of Conduct and its publication in the media could have been the end of the participants’ work, as they contributed to the issuance of a historical document, yet they decided to continue working, and establish a Council to give the document a dynamic continuity through an institutional dimension.  Therefore, the Code and the Council can be described as a stand-alone case that seeks to build a reality derived from the eleven principles, or at least to prepare for the construction of this reality. This case of social mobility carries within it the seeds of the desired future for Syria, which is the emergence of a social current that transcends political affiliations. The Code, through its reliance on the neutrality of its principles, and its Council, will seek to attract everyone.

Clearly, supporting the Code of Conduct doesn’t mean that everyone should seat at the council table, this is not possible for logistical reasons. Rather, it will be through adopting the ideas of the Code and the views of its Council and accepting the political other and the belief in the ability of the various political affiliations to create an inclusive current that will be the basis for any future political process. In this way, the formula has been completed: from the Code of Conduct for Syrian Coexistence to the Council of the Syrian Charter and then to the inclusive socio-political current.

Conclusion:

Perhaps the term utopianism is the first thing that comes to mind when one hears the idea of ​​forming a common Syrian societal current that crosses political affiliations. And one cannot blame this way of thinking – after all, the ideas and proposals for resolving the Syrian crisis took place in a vicious circle during the past nine years. However, the experience of the Code of Conduct showed the possibility of agreement on certain principles between Syrians with different views of what happened and is happening in Syria.

To be honest, it must be said here that these same people were not convinced at the beginning that through dialogue they would be able to reach any consensus on any issue. One of the most important convictions that led to the consensus on the Code is the need to agree on a specific issue at a particular moment. Perhaps this idea of ​transitionalism can contribute to creating the conviction that the deep affiliations and their overlap is a matter that must be overcome, at least for the time being, in favor of an alliance that combines opposites in terms of affiliation, opinion and conviction.